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P I E F A ( E
The r rai- object, with vihlIe I have PPet out in
tnis siort treatise, has beenl to delineate the :Oeneral
lrinciples w-hich overi the law of infant's contracts.
On most of tie questions treited herein, I have
followed the weight of authority, but in tre.tl:, some
questions it has been so obviously presented to rVny Nilnd
that re.Ason and justice pointel in the opposite -irec-
tion, that I have attempted to show thLe more logIcal
side of the case.
I must here ackno-wledge, in justice to others, the
help that I have received fron the valuable surliestons
of' H-. 3. utchins, Professor of Domestic Relations in
the School of Law at Cornell University; also that re-
ceived from that widely known book of "Leading G;asos on
Infancy" etc., cornp-led by l[arshal ). Eell.
Cornell University, ,i. Y., April, 1891.
Leon L. Fanche-r.
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P AlK T I.
I N T O 0 D U G O1' 1 0 N
The comon law fIxed upon the tge of twenty-one
as the time when infants should attain their majority.
This Is the law In every otote of this country which
has adopted the common law as a part of Its system
of jurisprudence, except i. here changed by statute.
In different countries and tin,ler various systm-ris
of jurisprudence, varioU8 periods have been fIxed
upon for attaining majority. By the -i. I law Inf'8nts
rettee their majority at the age of twenty-five years,
this also was the tlre fixed upon by Spain and Hollqnd.
Among ,heC Treeks anf early Romns wormen woere
never of age, this law, hov,,e<er, was gradually chanqed
until In the ti-me of Justlnlan, omten as well t)o men
became of age at twenty-five. In law a person is
twenty-one years of' fi'e on the last 'lay of the twenty-
first year of his life. For exarm-le, In I Salk. !-.
44 (anonymous) a man who vito born on the first lay of
February 1600, after eleven o'clock at night, V.)f ad-
judged to be of full tge the cocond minute after one
o'clock on the morning of ti'e last (lay of Janusary 1621.
In this ca.e the m.an had not live1 tweity-one
years by about forty-coven hours, but he wan, recog-
n!r:ed as having arrived at rmajority, becaune the la7
knois, no frictions of' days hence it make.- no differ-
ence whether a man Is born on the first or laot hour
of the day.
In some of the ntatec females are declared to
be of full i-,;e at e!.gteen; this 18 a statutory rule
and has been adopted in Ver'mont, Oregon and Ohio. As
the statutes of Ne;,; York are silent on this subject
the comr,.on law rule remtalnq anl the age of majority
for both sexes is twenty-one yearo, toug.h, as in all
the st1,.1te3, infants are gIven certain privileges by
Gtatiite. As we proceed in the study of this subject
we shall see that with a few exceptions, infants are
dented the power of absoluTtely binding themselves by
contract. The reason given by the l-aw for placing
this restri eton upon their pover of contract'ing is,
thaLt they have not attained sufficient years of dis-
cretlon to be capable of judging what vil 11 be the monrt
beneficial to them. But it io necennary for the in-
terests of the infant and also thoes of society, that
certutin exceptionsohould be made to the rule, that ,n
Infant cannot bind himself absolutely by contract. As
examples of these exceptions we cee, that an Inf-int
can make a valld contract for the pureese of' recersar-
lee or of marria.ge, the one for the interests of the
infnnt the other for the interests of society.
rlie contracts whici. do not absolutely bind him
are those which are null and void and others whrih ma]y
be ratified or avoided at his pleasure. The division
alopted here io viz: First. Binring, if' clearly for
the benefit of the infant. Second. Void, if aupoint-
ing an agent or attorney, or are illegal by reason of
being against statute or public policy. Tlhrd. Void-
able, Including all contracts not falling v ,thin the
/ I
other tvio classes. short recume will also be giv-
en of the ratification and voidance of infant's void-
able contracts.
P A !" T I I.
F3I ND J(f C 0 N T P 1 C T S
of
I1 N F A N T S
BinrlinLg contrtetf; cf irif'ant , are t'ose ,h1r' the
law giver him authority to mnlKe and by which he io held
bound ab.9olutely. 'iThe benefltn, tba t he recelve,- from
this cl .w of' contrtictn by belnr able to bin,) hmself
absolutely, are greater than the prvlilege of repudi-
ation. Suppone, for exomple, that the infant Is sure
to possess the necesary funs in the future to pay
his d' btr, yet, if these exceptlono, were not )llo ed
by law, -e might die of starvation or exposure, by
rea son of' being unable to obtwin credit. The general
principle which deterraines whether an inftnt'8 con-
tract is binding or not is this; is it? or Is it not?
for hic) benfit, If the court can clearly see that it
Is for the infant's benefit he will be held boun by
his contract, but if this does not appear to be the
case it will be either void or voidable according to
clr-uistanceo. The most important of binding con-
tracts of Infants, are contracts for necessaries.
rihis class Includes all articles which are neces-
sary to an inftint according to hi, estate, fortune or
occupation in 11ife. Food, clothing, washing<, shelter,
medicine and educatlon come clearly under thte hefid of
necessarles, as Coke fs')ys, "an infont may binr] himself
to pay for his necessary metit, drink, apparel , necos-
nary physi ckS, and such otner neceusariem, and like-
wise for his good teaching, or ingtructlon whereby he
may profit himrelf aftervards.l" (1)
hefe are only a few of the many articles which
have been decider- by the courts to come under the head
of neressarles. The term "necessaries" Is relative
and governed by thie real and not the ostensible rank,
situation or riegree of the !nf-int in life. It is
not confined to bare support wnd oubsistance, but ha
recelveI a co-n(shat liberal construction accorling to
the infants fortune, estate and occupation. "The ar-
ticles must be for real use" and not "for ornamrient or
luxury" the.7 need not be such a- a person cannot do
without but should be suitable to the infant's oondlt-
lon and clrcu-mstances. (2)
A college education or a gold watch and chain
(1) Coke's Littleton, 172 (a)
(2) Peter's v Fleming, 6 1H.& Vi. 42.
would not be considered neceosaries for t poor man's
on., Whlle they undoubtedly would for a chlild of' for-
tune; the number of artlcle8 firtilahed and tiloo the
fact vhether the nf~nt Is not tilrendy sufficlently
supplied must be taken Into c:ons!.lertition. Although
the Inf-int Is bound for his necefsmrieo le l8 not bound
to pay the price agreed upon. The re8onableneos of
this may be inquired into by the court 8nd If' found
excenslve, will be reduced to the retl vvlue of the
,;oodn. If the Inf'nnt lives with the father, guardlan
or other pernon who oupplles him wit- necessarie-, he
can not be charged, even for neceosarleo; and one, v7ho
furnishes him with such articles, I,- bound to aocertaln
at hie peril the Infants need of them, though it seefms
the conduct of the partles may be such as to bar a
plea of Infancy. (1)
The Inquiry of the tradeoman as to the circum-
stances of the infunt Is not a conlitlon precedent to
the sale, but only what a careful and prudent business
man would do to Drotect himself as far as posslble
from loss. As the que,3tion, whether tne .irticles to
be furnished are necersarles or not depends upon the
(1) Dalton v Gib 5 Bing.N . 0. 1,98.
actual condition, situation et(-, of the Infant; after
all po: eble inquiriee are male t!.e artioles v,1 11 turn
out to be or not to be necenosurie auc 8ubeequet cl.r-
cunstances may develupe, therefore, this otep Is taken
only as a netter of prudence. No express promilse to
pay Is required to bind the infant (1) and an ImrDled
promie will be hold sufficient; however, wihere the In-
fant lives at home the poverty of the futi-er will not
be sufficient to raise an implied promise; but it must
be further shown that there was an absolute refusal to
furnish the necessary supply. (2) Upon such a Bhovwln
the inftnt vll be held responsible. fils liability
does not depend upon any allowance vhicb he may have
received fromr 1x1s father and which he has squandered
in recklen8 extravagance. (3)
Though, if the income of the inftnt Is sufficient
to provide himself vith necessaries tr-d he purchaies8
goods on rrelit the onus of showlng his den'titutlon and
necessity is on the party seeking to charge him. (z1)
Wht classes of articles are necessaries Is a
matter of law for the court to stolate to the jury; this
(1) Gay v Ballou 4 Wend, 408
(2) Freeman v Bridger 4 Jone's lav; 4.
(3) Burghart v 11iall 4 M, & Vi, 727'.
(4) Eivers v Gregg 5 Rich, eq , 274.
being; 'eterrTlned, it 18 t m,,)tter of fact for the jury
to lecife whther the partlcultr trtiole in quwti on
falls within any of' those clanseos; and, if It doec-,
whether it iS a necensry taking into consid'erttlon
the inftnts estite, fortune anrl ocupition. If the
jury find that 1,;ie article iB a necessary then they
must consider the araount charifed for it and if they
find that the num charged 18 more than vwat it 18
really w: orth, they must find it; reol value. (1)
But the rule of subm tting to the jury the fact, wheth-
er the article under consideration is a necensary or
not, IS subject to this qualification, that if thaere
io no evidence tending to Shom that the article in
question Ia a "necessary" then the court may vithdraw
the case from the jury; (,) but by the greti weight
of authority this Should not be done except in a very
clear case. (a)
As the various holdings of the cases., which ave
decided1 what are and what are not necessarleo, are too
numerous to be mentioned here1 a few exL~rnple8 only, wil1
be given. It has been helrl necennary that an infant
(1) Bent v Maning 10 Vt, 21-O.
(2) Johnson v Line, 6 ,w., a S, 30.
(3) Davis v Caldwell 12 Cush, 512.
should be provited'i w!tri a home and thtit an j,,)ree1ent
to serve for hlis board, clothes anrl schoollng until
he attains his majority vwill not aftervirds be question-
e'l by the courts. ,So also attorney fees Incurred in
defense of bastardy rroceediws, necensnaric-O furnished
for his wife and hIilldren and] horseback exercise when
prescribed by a physician, are nece carlec for him. (1)
But it seems that timber uned to repair or bullrl i
;1,ellinq house, rent of bulilings for carrying on trale
or manual occupation, balls, serenades and g:inerally
hiorses are not classed as neceosarl es. (>,) Nelther
in general is money lent to a minor a necessary, but
if it is lent to purchase necesnarles or pay a Iebt
contracts4 for them, equity w1ll holl him liable if
it Is actually applied to that purpose. (a) Also if'
money is paid at the reques.t of the infant, upon t-. debt
contracted for neceonarlee, or by a surety upon the in-
f.nto note given for them he will be held renporis1ole
for its repayment. (4)
(1) LwvellsLeadlng Cases on Infancy, 70.
(2) Ibid, 6B.
(0) Swift v Bennett 10 Cush, 437.
V'stson v Gross 2 DuvVll (KY) 149.
(4) Conn v Coburn 7 N. H, U68.
before leavini thie subject we should , l'nce at
the 'juectlo,, can a inf -nt binrt hie parents for neces-
saries without their consent? In the earlier cases
this was a mooted question, but by the -7,rettt weight of
later authorities it is held, he cannot; though aut,.or-
ity to Jo so may be infe el from ollght evi'lence. Thnere
is no better staterient of' tue lawv on thl1; subject then
tiatt given by Foster J. ; "A parent cannot be chari;ed
for nece;;,pmrios ftirnInhed by a 8tr-;er for hn r inor
chnild, exceptupon a promlrse to pay for them; and that
such promise Is not to be Implied from mere moral ob-
ligation, nor from the statutes provilding for the re-
-mbureerent of towns; but the oml,8sion of duty from
wvihich a jury may finl a prornloe by implication of' law
must be a legal duty capable of enforcement ,y iro-
ceoo of law.(" ()
As to what constitutes neceoaries there is no
inflexible aboolute rule, things that are necesasriec
for one may not be for another and under a change of
circumstances they rmay not be for the same nerf:-on.
Lhe next clam, of contracts under thin he,
(1) Kelly v Davis 49 N. h{. 1'6.
Mortirmer v V-Jright 6 1. & h. 482.
(fordon v Potter 17 Vt. {48.
Raymond v Loyl ID Barb. 483.
!o that of marriage. The fnct that an infant I8 com-
petent to enter into the marriage relatlon has alreoldy
been mentioned. This power 1o not g ven him because
of Its insign ficance, for it carries wl th it duties
and responsib~li ties far beyond tito ,e of any other
contract. But b.,cause it is w-lnqt public policy
that he should be able to break the mrr!i e tie at
his pleasure. If the infant has reach'ei the a:, of
legal consent he will remain bound upon the same con-
dltlons as an adult, ,,th perhaps a few statutory ex-
ceptions. At common law the age of iegl conceat was
fourteen years for males and twelve years for females,
this rule has been changed in some of the Ptetes,
though not generally. Upon arriving at,the age of
legal conscent (if the marriai--e takes Ulace urior to
that time) no new ceremony is necessary to corplete the
marrlage at common law, but the election v7111 be in-
ferred from clrnurstances; such an continuel cohab-
itation, "and er-en slight acts mmw suffice to rcov the
intent of the parties." The last class, of' binding
contracts of' infonts, is that of enlistment, t 'te bind-
Ing force of' x=ich ar!. es fro-,- public statutes.
The Revlfed 83Ytuten of the United ';ttltes riro-
vleo that minorB. mrnt be enlisted Into the uubllc ser-
vice. IThe rules prescribed for enlistment into tre
army are, thtt "i~o minor under th e of slxteen yearn
shall be enlisted or mustered into the publlc nervlcc
"of the United States. " -or "If under twenty-one
Years" "without the viritten consent of fis parents or
guardians; provided thnt sur-, minor han such parents
or guardlians entitled to als cu,-,tody or control." The
rules prescribed for enlistment into the naval servIce
are, that "No mlnor under the age of elxteen years 8hall
be enlisted Into the naval service," But that "IBoyn
between the aq'e of sixteen and eighteen yeatrs may be
enlisted to zerve in the navy, until they shall ariive
at the aw-e of twenty-one", tliouglh "not without the con-
cent of their parents or t!-,.eir guardians," (1)
VL rnenever a public statute authorizes a contract
whin 1ni manifestly lntende to be entered into by an
inf'ant It must nececsarl ly be deemed bindln(7 upon him.
Though, if fraud or undue advan se le taken of his a(te
or situatlon, by the iubllc awents, the contract could
(1) United States Revised Statutes ;f111-18, 141Ed-20.
not l:i rewon be enIfoI wl. (1) Another rpoint tn,t
8ho UlM be mentlone in thle connectlon In thaft In vr r-
loun cm .en the i nlace- 1h Infnt In the poe ltion of
a tru.n tee and any ac ts v, I o r ny do in t ,t CL apacl ty
vill bf!1 'Alhm. HIe will alno be bourl by acte vol-
iaLtarily perfor aer, walch by law he could have bon
corpellel to perforra. ;A ancient ,maxiun of' tile co yie
law being7 t'tt "Ceeioral ly whatsoever an infant Is bouril
to to by la,,v t'ie .zv ie ohal) bln' hlra albeit he dloth It
vltiiout sult of law. " In theoe cases he lo held
bounl. through conprieoratlon of the rliVhtU of' otiler,
and to prevent circulty of action, r--t'ier than frola an.y7
coatruict relation.
(1 ) ti eta State. P BaInbrit1de ilason 33.
P A R T III.
VC I D Q UN T B A I 7
o f
I i F A N T S
To eeprite an nIfatil '8 Void arl bindrin contrac o
i1 qa easy taEk, ao coi ared wt th t of' OepOratLn1
hi- void md voidable Cotracto. The varlous attovrlltS
ma-Ae by the authorlttt ec, to iraw a ,3ntirp dllVdlnK l.nre
betweel an Infant'8 void and voldable contruct6 and
the confused uoe of the wordo void an,! voldable,ha
resulted in dlsorder and confuelon. To harvaonize the
varioue authorilties would be an Impomlbl Itty, and the
attempt only, v71ll be m'Ie here, to 7_lve a 9hort
rdonne of" th--e lai asi lal1 doin by thie root authorl-
tat 1 ve decioo and wrter8.
It 13 well settle1, ttat a void contract I8 inoa-
sable of' rattfotction; it is also -i, fir-ly settled,
thnat a voidable conLtract may be rat' fied and renlered
a8 binling and effecual (as though it had been eyecut-
ed by an adult. Lord CilIef' Justice tyrie in IKeene
v Boycott (1) laid down the loctrine, that where the
court could pronounce the contract to be to the pre-
(1) Keene v Boycott 2 Fl. Black 511.
judIlce of the infant it was void; and- in those cases
i,hore the benefit or prejudice vms. 'ucert'lJn the coa-
trAct xm;ac3 voidable only. " Uut thle rule wue3 soon
foiund to be subject to 1atny roll ficationo and excep-
ttons. Thus Story J. in Ticker v Morolnad (1) .s ys :
"It is apparent tzien upon End-ltha authortties, that
however true it may be that an infan-t maijy o far bind
hAimself by deed in certain cases, as that in conse-
quence of the solerr ity of the inetrmnent it is void-
able only, and not void; yet, that the 1nstritment, how-
ever .olemrin, Is helri to be void, if upon Ito face it
is apimarent that it 18 to the prejudice of the infant'
"This distinction, If admitted, would go far to re-
concile all the canoes; for it would ecide that a ieed,
by virtue of its solemnity, should be voidable only,
inless It appeared on its face to be to his prejud~ce
in which case it would be vold." The tendency of the
courts to make all acts and contracts of infants void-
able instead of void is recognized by Chancellor Kent
in his Commetarlec (2) where he says, a-, a result of
an examlnatlona of the American authorltles, "he finds
them in favor of construing the acts and contracts of
(1)Tucker v loreland 10 Pet. 5 6.
(2) 2 Kent's Com. Lect, 31.
inf nts3 ,e:Aerul1y to be voidable only aril riot void;
and thait th e doctrine of Zouch v Parwis hafm been
renognized to be and adopted , ln'. " The rule of
Keene v Boycott has become practically obsolete Ut
the present lat:y, and the Tnoderi Joctrine on this sub-
ject, may be retrlel as settled, that ,ill contracts
of i'fiti-ts (exceut for appointment of an a-,ent or at-
torney) not in themselves illegal, are voidable only.
Urofessor Parcoo-s in his work on "JIotes and 131118"
says, that the "old dilstlnctlon between void ani void-
able contracts of an infant" "haFs, becPome practically ob-
solete; all the contracts of an infant not in them-
selves illegal belng capable of ratificationL by him,
hei an adult, an'] therefore being voidable only, for
if once absolutely void no ratification could give thegn
any force." The leading ca;,e !ii modern decisions, on
this subject, is that of Festrow v WIFeman. (1)
7Mnd it is there stated by 3uskir1 J. , that the only
void contracts of an infant remaining are: First. Con-
tracts of an Infant appointing an nent or attorney.
1econd. Contracts that are illejal by reason of being
awainst statutc or public policy. Th8 limitation
(1) Festroa v '.!0iet:an .40 Ind. 14 8.
and 1lvislon Is i u oubte'lly ooundi an based upon modern
authoritles and affords an escape out Of tiC jfficulty
'jvr confuion of tie older cases. It iP belelveri thaft
it will afford equal protection to the Infant and pre-
vent necesary injur;¢ to third parties. T ough
many of the older cases have not been in terms over-
rule It perhaps has been only, because the Ideitical
poiats therein deterrined have not arisen and been car-
riel to the courts of last resort for adjudication.
The reason for excet)ii l appointment of attorney
from an infant'e voidable contracts is, that "the con-
otituting of an attorney by one whose acts are In their
nature voilable Is repugnant and Impo-)sble, for It is
lmpartln- a riglat whl oh the principle does not posness,-
that of doing valid act.. If the acts when -lone by
the attorney remain voidable at the option of the in-
fant, the power of at;,oi iey is not operative accorling
to its terms; if' they are binding upon tae infant trien
h as
aedA one tarough the a.-ency of another, rhat he could
not have lone dlrectly,-binding acts. The fandamental
srinclple of the law In regard to tnfants requires that
the infant should have the power of affirming such acts
done by the attorney ao he chooses, and avolding- others
at his optIon; but this Involves an Imrfed!ate contra-
d~ctlon, for, to pooets the r! 1ht of avalllni hvnmself
of any of the acts, he mu!-st ratIfy tAe Dower of' the at-
torney, and if he ratifies the power, all thiat was done
1uler It ii7 confirmed. If ie affirms part of a trans-
actlor, he at once confirms the power, and thereby
a ;ailnst his inte~it!Qn, affirms the whole transiactton."
(1)
1hat thae appointment of an ag ent or attorney is
void ha8 beeti recognized. by a long line of decisions.
And this is so even though fraud or collusion be
siown on the part of the rInfarnt. (2) This rule) ho,-
ever, seems to be subject to t!i.e exception, that an !n-
fant can appoint an attorney to receive seisin. It
should also be mentoed that I'assachusette Is an ex-
ceptjoLi to the general rule and has deoldel the ap-
poIntmont of attorney. at least to perform simple coi-
tracts, to be voidable. The reason for making the oee-
ond exception (given by Buskirk J. ) to an infant's
voidable contracts is ap parent from t-ie language of the
exception itself. Contracts declared void under 37
(1) 1 n~.Terlcan Leading Cas,,s (4ed) 42.
(2) Sander-on v M1arr 1 H. Black, 75.
and 8:3 Victoria, for exIrmple, come v1 i thil ti i d 1.iv1aioi.
rThls otatute proviloo that "all contr.,its which before
by lavi were voidable, wlhetoter oy m5pecii'llty or by siiple
contract, entered into b. Infaint8 for tie repayment of
money lent, or for goodn oupplied (other than contracts
for neoesenarleo) and :tll accounts staIted vrit infauit.C
snall be absolutely vold;" and "no action shall be
brought upon any ratificatio-i made after full aqe of'
such oontracts, whether ouch ratification be based upon
ae., t consideratton or not. " This otatute seems to
set at ret in England1, the question, whether an Ir.-
fant's contraot. are voil or vollable. However, it
vTould seem that, it cannot be ,s beneficial to the in -
fant, a8 a statute making his contracts vol,lable and
thus allowing him the prIvIle-;e of ratification or
arcoidance.
-A R T I V.
V 0 I .D A B L E (' ) ii T R A 'T S
of
I i F A , T S
The last ivision of Inftrit's contracts Is, thore
winlcDi are vollable. The first thing to be ascertained
18, iwhat contracts of Inftints are voidable. The ear-
Per Ca: e hell, teInt "1suc-A contracts as are of an un-
certain nature as to the beifi t or prejudice" of the
Infnnrt. "are voidable." But, as hap 'ilre'Ady been ex-
plained, this doctrine hua become practically obsolete
and the queotion of to lay 1, vhether the contract io
bin-!ni. or void, if neither it is voidable. There-
fore, the first thing to be deter-nner Is, whether the
cofitract comes :1 thln any of the classes of bindln.- cor-
tracts, if it does the contract is binding; but if It
does not t;en it mu<it be asce tuinel, whether it is
a contract for appointment of -ttormey or Is 1lle l
by statute, If either of these 'question is settled;
but Jf not it is voidable and may be ratifie'l or avoli-
ed by the infant. 3y glancln; over tie contracts of
an infant it will be seen, that by far tae larger part
of them are voidable. The numb.br being so ire:t thrnt
the prticiple ccaos only can be use here, as exam-plen;
thus the importance of thic dfviolon. There are two
classes of" infant's voldable contracts viz: executed
and executory. An executed contract is one which has
been whlolly perforried on at least one side. Deeds,
mortgages, sales of' personal property, chattel mortgages
etc, come withift this cla3s. It s well settled now
that deeds and mortgnes of an infant are voidable,
though several of the earlier caee. decilded them- to be
void. The doctrine of those casen was superseded by
that of Zouch v Parsons. (1) Lord Mansfield and
the court there approved of' the law as laid down by
Perkins (§12) that,,"all gifts, grants or deeds made
by infants by matter of deed or in writting which do
take effect by the delivery of his hand, are voidable
by himself, by his heirs and by those who have his
estate," And in LorijMansfield's view the words
'
4which ,o take effect" are an essential part of the def-
initioi and exclude letters of attorney and Taere powers
which convey no interest. So that in Lorl 'Mansfield's
opinol there is no difference between a feoffMent and
(1) Loucl v Paroois, 3 Burr 1304.
a deed wihlch conveys an Interest; and there can be but
little doubt, but that hi, decision wao correct.
In re,;:-rd to the sales of' pers rial property,
chattel mortgages etc, they have long been recognized
by the aut' orltlea as executed contracts. The second
class viz: executory contracts, may be Tefined, as those
contracts chch are wholly unperformed, or in which
something remains to be lone on both sides. Corl8id-
erable confusion has arisen from the incautious use of
the words void and volable and when it is said, that
an Infant's executory contracts are voidable, it must
be taken in the sense, that though they have no binding
force as they ttind, they may be rendered binding- at
the will of the infant. rfherefore we should be caref1U.
to destilguish between the word vollable, as applied to
an infant's executory and executed contracts. Under
these circumstances an tafant's promissory note is not
void in the sense of' a mere nullity, because it may be
made valid. -owever, It should be noticed, that thouli
an infant's pro-'issory note is usually spoken of as an
executory contract, this 18 not strictly true as a gen-
eral rule, because it is usually given for an executed
conelderation; and would be more properly spoken of uq
a partially executedr contract. A hypothetical ex-
ample of thIs clanB of contracts in, if A should prorl-
Ise to pay 13, a certain sum of money -tt i futLire rTiy,
in return, for a pTrorlope bj/ 3 to perforr cert:-in ner-
vices for him. In thi s case oomethlng remani n to be
performed on both silen. It Is now expedient to
notice, that the equita' le doctrine of the present lay,
differs not from that of the legal, in re ,arJ to the
contracts of inf'ants. In short, the liberality and
freedom exercled in common law courts "in shaping
general doctrines, with reference to infants and their
contracts, must be ascribed in a lar:, e degree to. the
influence of equity, tribunalo and their decisions."
PART V.
h A T I F I C A T IO A N 1 A V ( 1 u ) A N G E
of an
I il FAN T'S V 0 1 1 A 3 L E COTHAC TLS.
Tiat infants are favorites of the law, Is ae
firmly established as the law itself. It's protoction
Is exterilel over then, to pregerve their true lnterest
a~;ninst their own improvidonce, if need be, or the sin-
ister designs of' others. ",,Ie see this principle at
work in the ;eneral transactions of infants, controllinq
and regulating them in great m-easure and serving, bet-
ter than other, to explain the shifting and contradic-
tory decisions of Eng1lsh and Inerican courts on this
vexed subject. But in no privilege allowed them, do
we see ;re,-iter proof of this then in that of' being able
to ratify or avol-I their voidable contracts. The law
so far protects triera in this class of contracts, that
having arrivedl at full age, they are given an oppor-
tunity to considlel the probable tendency and effect
of their bargain; to review the circumstances under
which it was made; and having weig hed ts advantages
and dIsadvant',!Kes to ratify or avoid it. If' it 18
ratified, the original contract become,) binding and
may be enforcel; the rattficrmtion ivwi life and valid-
Ity to the oi1 prornrl,e ind if the contract lo enforced
at law, it will be by an actlo on the original aree-
ment and not on the ratifloaton. On the contrary, If
the contract 18 avoilded, it be(,orref voird ab .nitlo and
the 1)artles revert to the situation they would have been
In if it .,1,il not been made. nhe -. rlnclple, unon which
the law allow-8 the Infant to ratify or avoid hli- void-
able contracts, after havinf;" attained majority, i8,
that he 18 supoposed to have acquired the poier of de-
ci lng vwhether the contract In quection i8 one of' Sue
a character, that In equity and good conscience he
oug-ht to be bouirnd by it or releaceo] from it. V.'here
the infhnt dec1 d eo to exerc!,e ht a prIvilege. of Uvold-
ance n a uitt brought a!lrInr3t him to enforce !s deed,
he connotplead. non eot factum and give his Infancy In
evidence, but muct plead his infancy peclIual]y. TO e
reanvn for this beln(g, that the rdeed has operation
from its delivery; though ivwhen Fivoir]l-, the avoidance
relateo back to Its inception. Nciaher con he avoid
it in part, but TuSt e.erc!:e his prlvllege in tots If
at f11. However, thlO otatemerit mu;3t be unlerloorl in
the senone, tlitit the contrsa c,, le an entire one; inrln It
5COer , h',t ,here the contr'w consil, of paito,
having no reltitlon to eao,, otler, that a conflir ,ton
or avoidance by puro or by acts may be in -,art; and in
Sueh cases the .1irty x!11 be l1lblo only for such partg,
a9 stand conflrrre-1 or avol ted. T1e case ot Hlubbard
v n 11Us (1) lllutruteo thi e point stated above,
the plainzlff's testator conveyed land to one Dudley,
an Infant, ,ho -ve a mortgage back for the purse
rrice. After IuIley bec fze o  e he conveyedr the lard
to lefenlent -.-Ith a warranty of cletir title, the -,rounl]
for giving such %uarranty being, that he ru tifieo the
Jeed of' conveyance and isffil the rnort.fge. The
court hold1, that thc zcivin, of' the dee and mortc:' 'e
as one trun,,tiolo and that it must be confirmed or
disaffirmed tote.
Under the head of voldable contracts of w-m infuwit
we sav; thbt they vwere divil]ed into those whicb are ex-
ecuted and executory; but for convenience an other di-
vision vll be added here, vwl>ich will be called par-
tially executed contracets. The -definitions of ex-
S! ) 8.ubb rd v Cmrningo , 1 ane, 11.
ecuted and exenutory contract,; have liy been glve'.
and it ic- now our province to l-,cuso the subject gen-
e r i ly.
It is a generatl rule, tht atn lnfant (annot a; oil
his contra(ct executei : y himsoelf' and wlhlch i. vol(lbr;le
only, ';.)lie within age. But l rule must be taken
v'l th this limitation, th.:t thie delay shall not work un-
avoidable Drejudice to the infant or the object of his
prlv le ;e, vhich is intended for his protection, would
not be answ]ered-. v'hen applied to a sale of his prop-
erty it must be his ltivl -- a case in Which he may en-
ter an receive the profits, ontil the power of finally
avoiding shall arrive, " Should the la: extend the
sare doctrine to sales of his personal estate, it viould
expose him to greAt loss In many case,-; and we shall act
upto the principle of protection much more effectually,
by allowing h1im to rescind in such cares, wThile under
-;'e, though he may sometimes misjudge and avoId a con-
tr'ct which is for his benefit. The true rule, then,
appears to be this; that where the "infant can enter
and' hold a subject of sale until he is of age, he shall
be Incapable of avoldIngi until that time," but uhere
the "possesos on Io chwied anrl thero Ic no le ,1 nons
to reiln an,] hold it, in the mean time, the infant or
hin guardltn for hiIT" may Oxerci se the power of' reciol cn
imnedlately. ( 1 )
The authorities tire very inharrionlous In their
decloion, on the que;,,Ion of hown 3c,on tfter )tt,,-inIng
m-njerity the infant must exercise his privilege of
avoidacnce. Some cttse, hol, that this privilege may
be ex:ercloed at any time after renching majority, tun-
til it is barred, by the statute of limitatlons;(2)
though a les period, tiken in connectioin vilth other
ci ro~urstnes may amount to a confirmation; 9s by way of
estonupel wlhere an infint vendor -7tHnr]o by, after reach-
ing majority and sees elx-tenslvt improvement8 made upjon
the nrerilses in juestion, by his vendee. (Cl Another
class of' cases hold that he must avoll his deed if at
all vithin a reasonable time after attaining majority,
this seeras to be a more just rule and is adouted in
Iowa by statute.'(41) But it seems, as though the
moot practicable method, of solving this question for
all parties concerned; is to adopt a statutory period,
(1) Stafford] v hoof, 9 Uowen, 626
(2) Prant v V'1ley, 2,3 Mv'ich. 164.
(L) Crecslinter v Lessee, of Welch, 1F) Ohio, 1')3.
(4) Stout v 'erril, 35 Iowa, .6.
wlithin which the inf!it mustl exerciso hieo privilegeo of
dlafflrmiiace or the contract ohall otand confirmed; ex-
cent where fraud is shown to have been used to deprive
the Infant of hin rights. It should also be noticed,
that at common law a feme covert, rarrie. during in-
fancy, has the slme length of time after her release
from coverture to avoid her contract8 made before her
marrla~fe, that an infant has after reaching his major-
Ity. As to confirmation or avoldance of an infant's
dee,, there is a well recognized distinction betw-een
those acts necessary to confirm, or avoid it. Some au-
thorities assert!ig that a deed cannot be avoided, ex-
cept by an act eually solermn witi the deed itself.
But all the authorities recogn te the doctrine, that
acts vhich wouli be Insufficient to avoid a deed, may
amount to an affirmance of it.(1) There Is a
reaoon for this distinction, for as an infant's
deed is not void; hris avoidance of it must nec-
essarily retransfer the ownership of the lands. There
is a fitness in the rule, that the title to land shall
not pass by acts less solemn thian a deed; that itt2 own-
ership shall not be diveqted by any thing inferior to
that which conferred it. On the other hanrd a confir-
(1) Irvine v Irvine. 9 Wal,?r1p V-
matlon passes no title nor tiffects any change of prop-
erty. It is, therefore, an act, lees solerin than atn
be
avoidance and should Aeffected in a leso soler.-n manner.
An it 18 not doubted, but that tny act distinctly and
unequivocally manifestlni an intention to confirm vlll
effectuate that purpooe. Thls rule applies not only
to deeds but to all contracts of infants. A deed,
may be confirmel, by recital In a second deed referring
to It and recoignlzing It8 valldlty (1) also accept-
ance of rent. after reachin- majority "IIl confirm a
lease, or the disposition, under the same circimstances,
of property purchased by hlm. (2) As stated above,
the nature of the orlglnal act or conveyance, Fenerally
governs as to the nature of the act required to be done
In the disaffirmance of It. If the latter i8 of as
high and solenn a nature ao the former, it amount, to
a valid avoidance of it. But It should not be uner-
stood, tht in all cases the act of disaffIrmance must
be of the same or t,: high and solernn a nature as the
orlginnl act, for a deed may be avolided by a plea. 7ne
authoritative ca,e8 hold that an infant can avoid his
deed given during minority by a sale after reaching)
(1) Boston Bank v Chambelaln, 1b-- Masc. , 220.
(2) Laws on V Lovejoy, - Maine, 406.
rijorlty without t previous entry upon his land. (1)
However, if' the land 1s held adversely, entry rnuf-Dt be
miade in. those s1,, ten vhere one out of possenolon can-
not colivey. (')
So Ulso .n Inf',nt may avoid hif void]able deed
Ui-on rea,cng rmajorlty, by an .ictlon of ejectment,to
recover pono er)ccon of the premise;; or by any other
ppropriLatc.process. (O) Some of the cases holding
that the mere bringingT of' the suit Is a s9ufflclent
avoi'iance, vxhile others require notice of disaffirm-
ance or. "some other act of equni notoriety". The doc-
trine of the latter cases seems to be correct, for it
Is difficult to see how a person, who has come right-
fully into possession, can be treated as a wrong doer. (4)
The fact should not be overlooked that the ri!ht of an
infant to avoid Is absolute and] may be exercised ,pan_
bonafide purchtncero from his grantee. (5)
the inf'tnt after reucing majority, confirmn
his contract, it becor.ies bin'ling upon him and cannot
afterwar-1- be disaffirmed. But his avoidance of' It
hoc the contrary effect an-] ren.ers- all acts done under
(!) Tucker v Moreland, 10 Tet. 58.
(2) Boot v Mix, 17, 'end 133.
(3) C!adborne v 1ookliff', 30 Maine, 33.
(I ) Clo v on v Doe, 1acfllf. 300.o ) 1 ie rcs.28
tt null and vold, gi'lirw the laf',tit on the one haInd, tLr
r, ' t to demand and recover the property -old; and
on the other ha ud, entitling the other contrwmtlng
party to the right to 1e m-ni and recover the consider-
atlon recelvel by the infant, or so much of it as may
then rema in in hi,, hanle -n spei e._ }l't if the lnf(mAn f,
ha, none of the origlnal consolleratlon in hie possesoion,
the queE.tion, in case of an infant'o executed contract,
becormes more Intricate andl Ic one upon whic h the courts
are thoroughly mixed up and divlded. However, the
weight of authority and what deerio to be the corrct
rule is, that if the ,.nfant has during 1nfaacyl'wasted,
sold, or other'wiee disposed of or ceased to poqseop the
consideration, and has none of it In his hanls in specie
on arriving at mtjority, he is not liable therefore and
,,imy dlsafflrm without teadering or ecolmting fror such
cons ideration, " "le who de,,l8I o th the inf!,nt deals
at his peril and Oubjcct to this privilegfe of the in-
fant to disaffirn and avoli his nontracts." (1)
"The right to reclnd., is a legal right estab-
(1) c t'Ia t r v 'ohl11f ard' j? ie ir a, l ( r at. 29.
P rico v Furman, 27, Vt. 2i3.
''alish v Young, 110 i3a;s. 899.
Mlannln v Johnson, 26 Ala. 452.
Carpenter v Carpenter, 45 Ind. 142.
lished f .r the protection of the Infant and to make It
lepenlent upon 'n impol'sibitlity, v hich !mpo:-ib1I1ity hm
resulted from acts x'h the lox, pren.uie' Mm ! ucap,'ble
of perf~hriiin,, would tend1 to irmi r the riglht and with-
druv: the protection" from the infnnt, givln,, it to the
adult and defeatlng t-re object of the rrlvilege. (1)
NUmeroins .ttempts, however, have been mnadte in the lo1VTr
courts of i,.ew York to distinguish the facts of (Green v
reen virtually attempting to shut out the cane alto-
gether, therefore the statement above should be taken
with care in iNew York. As to the execiutory contracts
cf' an Infant, it is univerotlly conceded that they -nay
be avoided as well during infancy as after rearhng
71ajor Ity. They have no blntlng, force untll conflr,-ied;
if avoided the parties are lift in statu quo, being frce
from: all oblig;atlon or liability under the contract.
There oeems to be a clear distinction, that shoould be
noticel between contracts executed and executory, no tc
;-lhat vull operate as a confirmation, much 'eos bein!
required in the former cuoe than in the latter. If
tle contract is executory and voidable there must be
not only an acknov,ledgment on the part of the infant
(1) ,reen v (Green, 69 14. Y. , 553.
to confirm it; but also an "expreoc promn1e to perform
(or positive acts equal to an unequivowl premilce) made
by the Infant tifter reaei)ing hie mtjority. " in1 thIs
prom!.:;e must be -made, voluntarily to the plaintiff or
his wTent, before the corriencement of the action; some
of the cases adding, that it must be made with full
knowledge that he is not legally liable thereupon. (1)
The most co mron example of this f'orm of' contracts Is
that of marrlow e. U ,lh the infant may avoid wit-rout
Incurring liability upon his promise; though if t; e
other contractinig party, belng an adult, should avoid
the marriage, damage s could be collected in a suit for
breoach of promise brought by the infint. (2)
For convenience 11 contracts some parts of which
have been perforrmei are treated here an partltl]y ex-
ecuted contracts. The rules as to the time v.wen and
vihat is necesary to ratify or avoid executed contracts
appli e8 to thl n class and it will only be necessary to
point out aL few, of their principal features. First;
where the contract has been executed on the part of the
infant, but not by the adult and the Infnit dlsaffir-m
tl,,e contract, having received no consileration there-
(1) l;ell's Leading Cases on Infancy 77.
(2) Hamilton v Lotmtx, 26 .arb. 615.
upon, he may sue for anrl recover the conolderatlon
movingO from him by any aiiproI)rltte action. The case e
of Ho1),0,9 v Bloi]!, (1) which upheld the contrary doc-
trine vz s vIrtuully overruled by the case of Corpe v
Overton (2) io that It i. viell settled, that If an In-
fant renders iervices upon i contract and afterwards
avoids it before it is wholly perforrnel he may sue in
quantum meruit for the v:-lue of those rendered. Ani
the defendent cnnnot set-off' aginst the value of the
plaintiff's services, ouch injuries as he may have sus-
talned, by reasion of the f: i lure of the infant to per-
form hie part of the contract, for thin would in effect
char,;e the infant vilth damages for Its violation.
Secon'; ,-here the contract has been executed in whole
or in part by the adult, it can be avoided as in other
cases; and if the infant sees fit to avoid the contract
he must return to tfre adult the conlderation received,
k12
if rernalninf in specle within is possessor control arr
capable of' return. -ut if the consieratlon, other
t'an neceosArlest:a been parted v;lth or iH incapable of
return the adult le wiithout a remedy; all authorities
aefreeing upon this rule.
(1) Holmes v Blogg, -3 Taunt. 15&3.
(2) Corpe v Overton, 10 Ping. 2 B2.
There seems to 1)e a '1i0tinction drawn betieen the
confirmatlon of a sale and of a purchase of property by
the lnft:nt, acts being required to confirm a sale which.
would not be necessary to confirm a purchase. Althou qq
this distinction seems to be Fgenerally recognized and
as betv,,een executed and executory contracts is quite
clear, "yet ,except as to the difference in the Implied
confirmation of executed contracts, as where the Infant
remains in possenCsloof the thing purchased after
reaching majority, W'1,. cA is held to amount to a confirm-
ation; and which, of course, does not apply to a sale
iadeto the infant If he has parted v.ith the possession;
there seems to be no well defined rule, as to the dis-
tinction In degree betveen the acts required to conffi-1
a sale or a purchase by an infant." And the question
seems to be one of intent on the part of the infant. It
now remains to consider, who may avoid an infants con-
tracts, Infancy is usually stated to be a personal
privilege, to be exerclsed only by the inftint himself;
but the oases whi ch use this language are mere dicta
as tc this point, or are thone where the privilege Is
sought to be invoked in favor of some third person, or
during the life of the infant. lherefore, they should
not be construed, as authorities aInr;t the exer(ci :e
of tIl-, 1_rl lel:e by the e rs or pernonI reprerenta-
tlve,; of the infant, in proTer cases. Tne rule an
stated by Perkins (.2) i that they "are voldable,
_:3elf.by his heirs ani by those ,h)o have hls e;ntate. "
It 1, ;ell settle-, that lurlri; the infant's life the
privilege of dioaffIrrming his voidable acts in oeroonal
ani cannot be exercised by any third pern,-,n for him.
Aid it is equally well settled, that after as death,
-i s heirs, executors and adImlinitrators, where they sue-
coed to -_13 estate or legally represnent the infant, may
exercise the o mme privlleg e. The pollcy of the law
being to tolerate no !iterferenice by strangers, wrong_
doers, or those ho have no 1egl 1interest in the sub-
ject miattor. qhe a.is:;7ee of the infant cannot exer-
cise this ;rivlle thlough there are nome dicta to the
contrary arslang mostly from ,isur,1,''vJ.nq of the
;or ls, "arid by those vho have his estate"l used by Per-
kins. Therefore, this privilege whlch i establInied
for the protection of' the infant cannot be made an ob-
ject of speculation by thilrd partles.
P AL} T VI.
S T A T U T O R Z
IR E G O M ivI E K I A T I c S
I 8hToUld not feel thIit I hrad done r,y uty iJ le3,1
I propoed,,l u re-c\ly: for the raost 'lOfectjve purto of thoe
1w4, of' infl-t,,. I will, therefore, reolraqend the fol-
lowIng bill to the consideration of the legiolaturen, of
the states of the unio, and particularly to tUt of the
state of Ne7 York.
A N A C T in relaton to trie contract,9 of rin-
ors. their ratific ti-on and avoilince.
The people of the st-.te of New York, represienterl
in S enate aIi Ascemnbl., T enact as follows;
Section I. All contracts, -vd,'e by minors, except
those now? construedI by the courts to be bIdnl upon
thea anid those whicoh are void by reaoo,_ of beinf aaisnct
statute or public policy, are voidable and :imy be rat-
i fiel or avoidel :y them..
Section II. All contracts, made by minors, which
are -leclarel by la; to be voldtable, may be avoidied by
thein upomnttalnin! rrajority, without retura of' coL-
CIderatiol reel v-I upon. such cotr nct, if none off , uch
conoideratii ohall re-ialn 1. i cuecie, in the posse:ni ou
or u-ider tie control of sai'1 minor it. the time of his
S ajority: Provtderl, th,.,.t no contracts of a Je,
ceaoto -1inor 8l 11 be avoi'rded ;)7 those vvo -ave hls ee -
tate, without return of consileration.
Section III. All contracts, macde by minors, wh!ic-
are leclarej by law to be voidable, shall stanl coi-
firnel, Lleps avoided by im vithin three .ears after
he shall have attainel' his majority, except v.ohere fraud
has been used to leprIve hinm of' his rights: but if he
shall not attain IMs majority the contract shall stand
confirme'! unless avoided by those who have his estate
within six months after his decease.
Section IV. Provided that this article shall not
affect the right of' avoidance, by the ainor, before ;t-
tairlin- majorlty, of' executory contr,-Icts cand contra-cts
in relatio. to Terooncil property.
It does not soem log,,ical tIt "appointment of' at-
torney" should be exepted fromn an infant's voidable
contT-icto and. an it in firdiy ,ettie. in ,qnrt nitAIteo
un'l partlcularly in tf.e Btute of' ieJ York ltheit it is
void, the only nole of c;haina1ri;" this rule tn by 8tntute.
As to t,_e necond oection, thou ,7x It -:,my not seem equit-
able at first i1,ice, upon ,. cloner e;:.,lnntinn it vill
be seen, thtit it carries out the very object of t'e I'-tv
of infants, for if infulfit. ,iere not Allowed to reocind
their contracts without retur:i of consideration they
would become the prey of' all w-ihon. they ml ht meet ind
frauds -::i thout number would be perpetrated upon tho .
The thirI section lB aldeT, because the object of the
ril-ht of' avoidance, is the protection of the infant
and it should not be used for 3Lpeculation. A-, if the
infant cannot decide i tIi1n three years ufter reaching
Tajority -;-hetIer or not he wise.s to avoid 1110 ontrtict,
it shoull in justice and equity to the other parties
to the contract strand confirmel.
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